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10	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA	
11	MARICOPA COUNTY	
	MARGOTA COUNTY	
12	SHARON NIEHAUS, ARIZONA	No.
13 14	SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, ARIZONA EDUCATION	APPLICATION FOR
15	ASSOCIATION and ARIZONA ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL BUSINESS OFFICIALS,	PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
16	Plaintiffs,	
17		
18	vs.	
19	JOHN HUPPENTHAL in his capacity as Arizona Superintendent of Public	
20	Instruction,	
21	Defendant.	
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23		
24	This case is a sequel to the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Cain v.	
25	Horne, 220 Ariz. 77, 202 P.3d 1178 (2009). In Cain, the Arizona Supreme Court	
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struck down a "scholarship" program that provided State funding for disabled students who wanted to attend religious and other private schools.

In its 2011 session, the Legislature enacted S.B. 1553, which creates another scholarship program for disabled students who attend private schools. The new program is a slightly revised version of one of the programs that were held unconstitutional in *Cain*.

During hearings on House version of the new program, the possibility of a legal challenge was discussed. Senate Rules Counsel testified that whether the measure was distinct enough from the program invalidated in *Cain* to be constitutional was hard to say and a "close call." House Committee on Rules mtg. 2/28/11 (video archives). Plaintiffs disagree. S.B. 1553 is plainly unconstitutional.

I. AN OVERVIEW OF S.B. 1553

A. Who May Receive a Scholarship

A copy of S.B. 1553 is attached as exhibit A. To receive a scholarship under S.B. 1553, a student must meet the definition of a "qualified student." To be a qualified student, a student must have a disability. The term qualified student is defined by the enactment in part as follows:

"Qualified student" means a resident of this state who is either identified as having a disability under section 504 of the rehabilitation act (29 United States Code section 794), identified by a school district as a child with a disability as defined in § 15-761 or a child with a disability who is eligible to receive services from a school district under § 15-763 and who did any of the following....

A.R.S. § 15-2401(5). The cited provision of the United States Code does not define or otherwise identify any category of disabled students. The reference therefore appears to have been an error. The remainder of the definition incorporates, directly and indirectly, the standard definition of "child with a

In addition to having a disability, a child must have done one of the following to meet the definition of a qualified student:

disability" found at A.R.S. § 15-761.

- (a) Attended a governmental primary or secondary school as a full-time student as defined in § 15-901 for at least the first one hundred days of the prior fiscal year and who transferred from a governmental primary or secondary school to a qualified school.
- (b) Participated in the empowerment scholarship account program in the previous year and whose parent renews the agreement pursuant to § 15-2402, subsection B.
- (c) Received a scholarship under § 43-1505 and who continues to attend a qualified school.
- A.R.S. § 15-2401(5). To fall within subsection (a), a student must have attended a public school during the preceding fiscal year and must also have transferred from the public school to a qualified school. The term "qualified school" is defined by the enactment as follows:

"Qualified school" means a *nongovernmental* primary or secondary school or a preschool for handicapped students that is located in this state and that does not discriminate on the basis of race, color or national origin.

A.R.S. § 15-2401(4)(emphasis added). It is clear that a primary or secondary school must be "nongovernmental," or private, to meet this definition. There is some ambiguity as to whether the modifier "nongovernmental" also applies to a preschool, but the ambiguity is moot. Arizona's government does not offer separate preschools for the disabled. Any such schools must therefore be private.

In short, a student must have transferred from a public school to a private school to fall within subsection (a). Subsection (c) expressly applies only to students who attend a qualified private school. Subsection (b) applies to students who previously obtained a scholarship under the program. Such students could not have obtained a scholarship without qualifying under either subsection (a) or (c), so they must also be in private school. When one works through the definition carefully, it becomes apparent that only students in private schools can meet the definition of qualified student.

To obtain a scholarship, a student's parent must also make certain promises in an agreement with the Department of Education, including the following:

To enroll a qualified student for an empowerment scholarship account, the parent of the qualified student must sign an agreement to do all of the following:

1. Provide an education for the qualified student in at least the subjects of reading, grammar, mathematics, social studies and science.

2. Not enroll the qualified student in a school district or charter school and release the school district from all obligations to educate the qualified student.

A.R.S. § 15-2402(B).

In summary, to qualify for a scholarship, a student must have a disability and must be enrolled in a private school. The student's parent must agree to provide a basic education to the student and not to enroll the student in a public school.

B. The Amount of the Scholarship

If a student qualifies and if the parent enters into the required agreement:

[T] he department shall transfer from the special education fund pursuant to § 15-1182 to the treasurer for deposit into an Arizona empowerment scholarship account an amount that is equivalent to ninety per cent of the base support level prescribed in § 15-943 for that particular student.

A.R.S. § 15-2402(C). The base support level forms part of the amount of money that is paid each year by the State to its school districts to fund the maintenance and operations of those districts. See A.R.S. § 15-943. The figure is calculated mathematically by multiplying a dollar figure called the base level by a formula specified in statute. *Id.*; *see also* A.R.S. § 15-901(B)(2) (defining base level). The formula takes into account the number of students in a school district and some of their characteristics, including whether they are disabled. S.B. 1553 therefore

provides that a qualifying student will receive, as a scholarship, 90 percent of what 1 the State would otherwise disburse to a school district to support the education of 2 3 that student. 4 *C*. Permissible Uses of the Scholarship 5 6 The student's parent may use the money only for eleven purposes that are 7 specified in A.R.S. § 15-2402(B)(4): 8 9 (a) Tuition or fees at a qualified school. (b) Textbooks required by a qualified school. 10 (c) Educational therapies or services for the qualified student from a 11 licensed or accredited practitioner or provider. (d) Tutoring services provided by a tutor accredited by a state, regional or 12 national accrediting organization. (e) Curriculum. 13 (f) Tuition or fees for a nonpublic online learning program. 14 (g) Fees for a nationally standardized norm-referenced achievement test, advanced placement examinations or any exams related to college or 15 university admission. (h) Contributions to a qualified tuition program established pursuant to 11 16 United States Code § 529. 17 (i) Tuition or fees at an eligible postsecondary institution. (j) Textbooks required by an eligible postsecondary institution. 18 (k) Fees for management of the empowerment scholarship account by firms 19 selected by the department. 20 Subsection (h) appears to contain an error, as there is no discussion of a qualified 21 tuition program at 11 U.S.C. § 529. 22 Subsections (a), (b) and (c) expressly permit scholarship funds to be used 23 24 for tuition, fees and books at a private school. It is unclear what kinds of 25 expenditures are authorized by Subsection (e), "Curriculum," since there is 26

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26 27 ordinarily no separate charge for curriculum in schools. Because qualified students must attend a private school, however, the curriculum for such students will presumably be that of a private school.

In places, S.B. 1553 appears to contemplate that a qualified student can receive a scholarship for private post-secondary education as well as for K-12 education. See A.R.S. § 15-2402(B)(4)(i), (j); A.R.S. § 15-2402(G). However, only a "qualified student" may receive a scholarship. That term is defined in such a way that a student at a post-secondary institution would not appear to qualify. A.R.S. § 15-2401(5). Moreover, as discussed above, the amount of the scholarship available under S.B. 1553 is 90 percent of what the State would disburse to a K-12 school district for the student in question. A.R.S. § 15-2402(C). The State does not provide any funding to school districts to educate post-secondary students. The "base support level" for such a student would very clearly be zero. That would appear to be the amount of the available scholarship. Whether S.B. 1553 actually authorizes any financial support for students who attend private colleges, or merely creates the illusion that it does, is therefore unclear. The fact that the constitutional deficiencies in other parts of the enactment are not severable, however, as discussed hereafter, probably makes it unnecessary to decipher the puzzling provisions regarding post-secondary education.

The statute also permits scholarship proceeds to be used for other purposes—mostly inexpensive ones—including educational therapies or services;

tutoring services; testing fees; and fees charged by the Department of Education to administer the scholarship program. Since a student must attend a private school to qualify for a scholarship, however, it is inevitable that most scholarship proceeds would be used to pay the tuition at such schools.

II. S.B. 1553 VIOLATES THE AID CLAUSE

A. By Authorizing the Use of Public Funds to Pay Private School Tuition and Fees, S.B. 1553 Violates the Aid Clause

In Article 11, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution, the framers directed the Legislature to "enact such laws as shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system." The Legislature was also directed to make such appropriations as might be required for the maintenance and improvement of the public schools. Article 11, Section 10.

In furtherance of these goals, the framers enacted what has come to be called the Aid Clause, found at Article 9, Section 10:

No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation.

The Aid Clause furthered the framers' intent that Arizona have a strong public school system "by prohibiting appropriations of funds from the public treasury to private schools." *Cain v. Horne*, 220 Ariz. at 82, 202 P.3d at 1183. The Aid Clause was "primarily designed to protect the public fisc and to protect public

schools." *Id.* In combination, these clauses establish that the Legislature is supposed to provide education solely through the public-school system, and that it is prohibited from diverting funds to private schools.

The *Cain* court observed that the Aid Clause undoubtedly prevented direct appropriations of money for private schools. 220 Ariz. at 83, 202 P.3d at 1184. The statutes at issue in *Cain*, however, did not make direct appropriations for private schools. Instead, they made public money available to parents, subject to a requirement that the money be used to pay a private school. The court concluded that this indirection made no difference. "For all intents and purposes," it concluded, "the voucher programs do precisely what the Aid Clause prohibits." *Id*. It is clear from *Cain* that public funds may not be used directly *or* indirectly to pay for private education.

The program established by S.B. 1553 differs from the programs struck down in *Cain* primarily in that, while it allows parents to use the state funds to pay private school tuition, it also permits the money to be used for a few other specified expenses, some of which would not offend the Aid Clause. To the extent that S.B. 1553 permits parents to use state funds to pay private-school tuition and fees, however, its effect is the same as that of the programs that were invalidated in *Cain v. Horne*. It is invalid for the same reasons.

B. The Portions of S.B. 1533 That Violate the Aid Clause Are Not Severable

If the only defect in S.B. 1553 was that it violated the Aid Clause—which is not the case, as Plaintiffs will show hereafter—the Court would have to decide whether the provisions that permits public funds to be used for private education could be severed from the remaining provisions. The answer is that they cannot be.

Severability is inappropriate where the valid and invalid portions of a statute are so intimately connected as to raise the presumption the Legislature would not have enacted one without the other. *State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown*, 194 Ariz. 340, 344, 982 P.2d 815, 819 (1999); *State Compensation Fund v. Symington*, 174 Ariz. 188, 195, 848 P.2d 273, 280 (1993). Would the Legislature have passed S.B. 1553 without the provisions that permit scholarship proceeds to be used to pay private-school tuition? It seems highly unlikely. As discussed above, scholarship recipients must attend private school and must promise not to enroll in public school. Private schools obviously charge tuition. Tuition will ordinarily be far and away the largest expense for those who choose to attend a private school. Given that scholarship proceeds cannot be used to pay tuition, a scholarship recipient would receive a large sum of money that could be spent only on peripheral services, such as test fees and tutoring fees. The recipient would

have to pay the primary cost of private education unassisted, even though he or she will have surrendered the right to attend the free public schools.

As a whole, S.B. 1553 makes a sort of sense, even though the sense it makes violates our most fundamental law. If the provisions that permit payment of tuition and fees to a private school are excised, however, the enactment makes no sense. To leave parts of the measure in effect would be to risk creating a law judicially that the Legislature would never have chosen to enact.

III. S.B. 1553 UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CONDITIONS A BENEFIT ON A WAIVER OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

As mentioned above, S.B. 1553 requires that the parent of a qualified student to promise not to enroll the student in public school. If a parent were to enroll a child in private school and discover that the private school was not meeting the child's needs, the parent would apparently be barred from withdrawing the child from private school and enrolling him or her in a public school. For reasons of public policy, the State cannot constitutionally condition a benefit on such a promise.

The Arizona Constitution establishes a public education as a fundamental right of Arizona pupils between the ages of six and twenty-one years. *Shofstall v. Hollins*, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); see also Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. No. I79-

103 ("Every child in Arizona is entitled to attend the public schools on a full time basis").

It is well settled that neither the State nor federal governments may condition a privilege or a benefit on a citizen's agreement to waive a constitutional right. "When statutory or constitutional rights are granted to private parties as a matter of public policy, a governmental entity may not insist on waiver of those rights." Havasu Heights Ranch and Development Corp. v. State Land Dept. of State of Ariz., 158 Ariz. 552, 558, 764 P.2d 37, 43 (App. 1988) (citing City of Glendale v. Coquat, 46 Ariz. 478, 480, 52 P.2d 1178, 1179 (1935)); accord, Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Frost, 48 Ariz. 402, 407-408, 62 P.2d 320, 323 (1936) (although state could prohibit entry of foreign insurance companies, it could not condition their entry on a waiver of constitutional rights); State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 73, 178 P.3d 1190, 1197 (App. 2008) ("states may not condition the grant of a privilege on the forfeiture of a constitutional right").

The U.S. Supreme Court has explained the rationale for this established rule as follows:

[A] s a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.

Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94, 46 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926). Because S.B. 1553 conditions receipt of a scholarship on a parent's waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, it is invalid in its entirety.

IV. S.B. 1533 VIOLATES THE RELIGION CLAUSE

Article 2, Section 12 of the Arizona Constitution, which is known as the Religion Clause, provides in pertinent part that "[n]o public money...shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction...."

S.B. 1533 authorizes the use of public funds to pay tuition and fees at religious schools, and those schools need not alter their practices in any way because they are being paid with public funds. See A.R.S. § 15-2404(C). Part of what scholarship funds would inevitably pay for in a religious school, and part of what public funds would be "applied to," is religious instruction. S.B. 1553 therefore violates the Religion Clause.

In *Cain v. Horne*, the court's finding that the voucher programs violated the Aid Clause made it unnecessary to decide whether they also violated the Religion Clause. 220 Ariz. at 84 n.4, 202 P.3d at 1185. That may be the case here as well. If for any reason this Court finds that S.B. 1553 does not violate the Aid Clause, however, it should find that the enactment violates the Religion Clause.

V. DISBURSEMENT OF ANY FUNDS PURSUANT TO S.B. 1533 SHOULD BE ENJOINED

This action was brought pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 35-211 to 35-215, which authorizes taxpayers to obtain injunctions to prevent the illegal payment of public moneys. The statute applies when a litigant seeks to prevents disbursements pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. *Cain v. Horne*, 220 Ariz. at 84, 202 P.3d at 1185. Plaintiff was required to make a demand that the Attorney General seek relief as a prerequisite to filing suit. A.R.S. § 35-213(A). Plaintiff did so. See exhibit B. The Attorney General declined to take action. See exhibit C.

The presumptive remedy under A.R.S. §§ 35-212 and 35-213 is an injunction to prevent the illegal disbursement. The Arizona Department of Education is charged with disbursing funds pursuant to S.B. 1553. *See* A.R.S. §§ 15-2402(C), 15-2401(1). Defendant Huppenthal is vested with all executive and administrative functions of the Arizona Department of Education. A.R.S. § 15-231(B)(2); *see also* Ariz. Const. art. 11, § 2. He also has the power to direct the performance of executive and administrative functions of the Department. A.R.S. § 15-251(6). He therefore has the legal authority to prevent disbursements pursuant to the statutes in question. Defendant Huppenthal should therefore be enjoined from permitting any disbursements of public funds pursuant to the authority of S.B. 1533.

CONCLUSION

S.B. 1553 authorizes the use of public funds to pay tuition and fees at religious and other private schools. Such expenditures are prohibited by the Aid and Religion clauses. The enactment also conditions the availability of a scholarship on the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, which is prohibited for reasons of public policy. Defendant Huppenthal should be enjoined from disbursing any funds pursuant to the authority of S.B. 1553.

September <u>26</u>, 2011.

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EXHIBIT A

State of Arizona Senate Fiftieth Legislature First Regular Session 2011

SENATE BILL 1553

AN ACT

AMENDING SECTION 15-1182, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES; AMENDING TITLE 15, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, BY ADDING CHAPTER 19; RELATING TO ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNTS.

(TEXT OF BILL BEGINS ON NEXT PAGE)

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Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona:

Section 1. Section 15-1182, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to read:

15-1182. Special education fund: administration

- A. There is established a special education fund which shall consist of legislative appropriations made to the fund for purposes of this section and section 15-1202 AND CHAPTER 19, ARTICLE 1 OF THIS TITLE.
- B. The fund shall be administered by the superintendent of public instruction for the purposes provided in this article and article 7 of this chapter AND CHAPTER 19, ARTICLE I OF THIS TITLE.
- C. Each fiscal year the state board of education shall include in its budget request for assistance to schools a separate line item for the fund.
- D. The fund shall provide monies for the education of a child who has been placed in a residential facility by a state placing agency or who requires a residential special education placement as defined in section 15-761 OR FOR DEPOSIT INTO AN ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT PURSUANT TO SECTION 15-2402.
- E. If a child has been placed in a residential facility by a state placing agency, the fund shall provide monies for the following types of vouchers:
- 1. Initial residential education vouchers to fund the educational costs for any child, whether or not eligible for special education. This paragraph applies to a child who has been placed in a residential facility and who has either not received a comprehensive education evaluation as provided in section 15-766, who has previously received such an evaluation and was determined to be ineligible for special education services or who is eligible for special education and for whom necessary procedures for changing the child's educational placement must be completed. This voucher expires on the expiration of sixty calendar days or completion of the educational evaluation or review of special education placement, whichever occurs first.
- 2. Continuing residential education vouchers that fund the educational costs for any child, whether or not eligible for special education, who requires placement in a residential facility after the expiration of the initial education voucher and who is not eligible for a residential special education voucher.
- F. When a school district makes a residential special education placement, the fund shall provide monies to fund the residential special education placement.
- G. Monies in the fund are exempt from the provisions of section 35-190 relating to lapsing of appropriations. Any monies left unexpended may be distributed to school districts by the department of education for the following purposes:
- 1. To provide educational counseling, training and support services to a child with a disability in order to maintain the child's educational placement in the least restrictive environment.

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- 2. To provide educational transition assistance to children who return to their home after placement in a residential facility.
- 3. To train personnel for and develop and implement model programs for use by school districts to serve children with emotional disabilities.
- H. The total amount of state monies that may be spent in any fiscal year by the superintendent of public instruction for the purposes of this article AND CHAPTER 19, ARTICLE 1 OF THIS TITLE shall not exceed the amount appropriated or authorized by section 35-173 for that purpose. This article shall not be construed to impose a duty on an officer, agent or employee of this state to discharge a responsibility or to create any right in a person or group if the discharge or right would require an expenditure of state monies in excess of the expenditure authorized by legislative appropriation for that specific purpose.
- Sec. 2. Title 15, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended by adding chapter 19, to read:

CHAPTER 19

ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNTS ARTICLE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

15-2401. <u>Definitions</u>

IN THIS CHAPTER, UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES:

- 1. "DEPARTMENT" MEANS THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION.
- 2. "ELIGIBLE POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTION" MEANS A COMMUNITY COLLEGE AS DEFINED IN SECTION 15-1401, A UNIVERSITY UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS OR AN ACCREDITED PRIVATE POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTION.
- 3. "PARENT" MEANS A RESIDENT OF THIS STATE WHO IS THE PARENT OR LEGAL GUARDIAN OF A QUALIFIED STUDENT.
- 4. "QUALIFIED SCHOOL" MEANS A NONGOVERNMENTAL PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SCHOOL OR A PRESCHOOL FOR HANDICAPPED STUDENTS THAT IS LOCATED IN THIS STATE AND THAT DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF RACE, COLOR OR NATIONAL ORIGIN.
- 5. "QUALIFIED STUDENT" MEANS A RESIDENT OF THIS STATE WHO IS EITHER IDENTIFIED AS HAVING A DISABILITY UNDER SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT (29 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 794), IDENTIFIED BY A SCHOOL DISTRICT AS A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY AS DEFINED IN SECTION 15-761 OR A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE SERVICES FROM A SCHOOL DISTRICT UNDER SECTION 15-763 AND WHO DID ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:
- (a) ATTENDED A GOVERNMENTAL PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SCHOOL AS A FULL-TIME STUDENT AS DEFINED IN SECTION 15-901 FOR AT LEAST THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED DAYS OF THE PRIOR FISCAL YEAR AND WHO TRANSFERRED FROM A GOVERNMENTAL PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SCHOOL TO A QUALIFIED SCHOOL.
- (b) PARTICIPATED IN THE EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT PROGRAM IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR AND WHOSE PARENT RENEWS THE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 15-2402. SUBSECTION B.
- (c) RECEIVED A SCHOLARSHIP UNDER SECTION 43-1505 AND WHO CONTINUES TO ATTEND A QUALIFIED SCHOOL.

6. "TREASURER" MEANS THE OFFICE OF THE STATE TREASURER.

15-2402. Arizona empowerment scholarship accounts

- A. ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNTS ARE ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE OPTIONS FOR THE EDUCATION OF STUDENTS IN THIS STATE.
- B. TO ENROLL A QUALIFIED STUDENT FOR AN EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT, THE PARENT OF THE QUALIFIED STUDENT MUST SIGN AN AGREEMENT TO DO ALL OF THE FOLLOWING:
- 1. PROVIDE AN EDUCATION FOR THE QUALIFIED STUDENT IN AT LEAST THE SUBJECTS OF READING, GRAMMAR, MATHEMATICS, SOCIAL STUDIES AND SCIENCE.
- 2. NOT ENROLL THE QUALIFIED STUDENT IN A SCHOOL DISTRICT OR CHARTER SCHOOL AND RELEASE THE SCHOOL DISTRICT FROM ALL OBLIGATIONS TO EDUCATE THE QUALIFIED STUDENT.
- 3. NOT ACCEPT A SCHOLARSHIP FROM A SCHOOL TUITION ORGANIZATION PURSUANT TO TITLE 43 FOR THE QUALIFIED STUDENT IN THE SAME YEAR A PARENT SIGNS THE AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION B OF THIS SECTION.
- 4. USE THE MONEY DEPOSITED IN THE QUALIFIED STUDENT'S ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT ONLY FOR THE FOLLOWING EXPENSES OF THE QUALIFIED STUDENT:
 - (a) TUITION OR FEES AT A QUALIFIED SCHOOL.
 - (b) TEXTBODKS REQUIRED BY A QUALIFIED SCHOOL.
- (c) EDUCATIONAL THERAPIES OR SERVICES FOR THE QUALIFIED STUDENT FROM A LICENSED OR ACCREDITED PRACTITIONER OR PROVIDER.
- (d) TUTORING SERVICES PROVIDED BY A TUTOR ACCREDITED BY A STATE, REGIONAL OR NATIONAL ACCREDITING ORGANIZATION.
 - (e) CURRICULUM.
 - (f) TUITION OR FEES FOR A NONPUBLIC ONLINE LEARNING PROGRAM.
- (g) FEES FOR A NATIONALLY STANDARDIZED NORM-REFERENCED ACHIEVEMENT TEST, ADVANCED PLACEMENT EXAMINATIONS OR ANY EXAMS RELATED TO COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY ADMISSION.
- (h) CONTRIBUTIONS TO A QUALIFIED TUITION PROGRAM ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO 11 UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 529.
 - (i) TUITION OR FEES AT AN ELIGIBLE POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTION.
 - (j) TEXTBOOKS REQUIRED BY AN ELIGIBLE POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTION.
- (k) FEES FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT BY FIRMS SELECTED BY THE DEPARTMENT.
- C. IN EXCHANGE FOR THE PARENT'S AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION B OF THIS SECTION, THE DEPARTMENT SHALL TRANSFER FROM THE SPECIAL EDUCATION FUND PURSUANT TO SECTION 15-1182 TO THE TREASURER FOR DEPOSIT INTO AN ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT AN AMOUNT THAT IS EQUIVALENT TO NINETY PER CENT OF THE BASE SUPPORT LEVEL PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 15-943 FOR THAT PARTICULAR STUDENT.
- D. A PARENT MUST RENEW THE QUALIFIED STUDENT'S EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT ON AN ANNUAL BASIS.
- E. A SIGNED AGREEMENT UNDER THIS SECTION CONSTITUTES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE REQUIRED BY SECTION 15-802.

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- F. A QUALIFIED SCHOOL OR A PROVIDER OF SERVICES PURCHASED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION B, PARAGRAPH 4 OF THIS SECTION MAY NOT SHARE, REFUND OR REBATE ANY ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT MONIES WITH THE PARENT OR QUALIFIED CHILD IN ANY MANNER.
- G. ON THE QUALIFIED STUDENT'S GRADUATION FROM A POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTION OR AFTER ANY PERIOD OF FOUR CONSECUTIVE YEARS AFTER HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION IN WHICH THE STUDENT IS NOT ENROLLED IN AN ELIGIBLE POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTION, THE QUALIFIED STUDENT'S ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT SHALL BE CLOSED AND ANY REMAINING FUNDS SHALL BE RETURNED TO THE STATE.
- H. MONIES RECEIVED PURSUANT TO THIS ARTICLE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE TAXABLE INCOME TO THE PARENT OF THE QUALIFYING STUDENT.

15-2403. <u>Empowerment scholarship accounts: administration:</u>
audit: rules

- A. THE TREASURER MAY CONTRACT WITH PRIVATE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FIRMS TO MANAGE ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNTS WITH THE SUPERVISION OF THE TREASURER.
- B. THE DEPARTMENT SHALL CONDUCT OR CONTRACT FOR ANNUAL AUDITS OF A RANDOM SAMPLE OF EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNTS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 15-2402, SUBSECTION B, PARAGRAPH 4. THE DEPARTMENT MAY ALSO CONDUCT OR CONTRACT FOR AUDITS OF EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNTS AS NEEDED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 15-2402, SUBSECTION B, PARAGRAPH 4.
- C. THE DEPARTMENT MAY REMOVE ANY PARENT OR QUALIFIED STUDENT FROM ELIGIBILITY FOR AN ARIZONA EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT AND SHALL NOTIFY THE TREASURER. A PARENT MAY APPEAL THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION PURSUANT TO TITLE 41, CHAPTER 6, ARTICLE 10.
- D. THE DEPARTMENT MAY REFER CASES OF SUBSTANTIAL MISUSE OF MONIES TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INVESTIGATION IF THE DEPARTMENT OBTAINS EVIDENCE DF FRAUDULENT USE OF AN ACCOUNT.
- E. THE TREASURER MAY DEDUCT UP TO THREE PER CENT OF THE AMOUNT OF STUDENT STATE AID FROM EACH EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT FOR THE COSTS OF ADMINISTERING EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNTS UNDER THIS CHAPTER, INCLUDING COSTS INCURRED BY THE DEPARTMENT.
- F. THE DEPARTMENT SHALL MAKE QUARTERLY TRANSFERS OF THE AMOUNT CALCULATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 15-2402, SUBSECTION C TO THE TREASURER FOR DEPOSIT INTO THE EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT OF EACH QUALIFIED STUDENT.
- G. THE DEPARTMENT MAY ADOPT RULES NECESSARY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNTS.

15-2404. <u>State control over nonpublic schools; prohibition; application</u>

- A. THIS CHAPTER DOES NOT PERMIT ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OR SUPERVISION OVER ANY NONPUBLIC SCHOOL OR HOME SCHOOL.
- B. A QUALIFIED SCHOOL THAT ACCEPTS A PAYMENT FROM A PARENT PURSUANT TO THIS CHAPTER IS NOT AN AGENT OF THE STATE OR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

- A

- C. A QUALIFIED SCHOOL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED TO ALTER ITS CREED, PRACTICES, ADMISSIONS POLICY OR CURRICULUM IN ORDER TO ACCEPT STUDENTS WHOSE PARENTS PAY TUITION OR FEES FROM AN EMPOWERMENT SCHOLARSHIP ACCOUNT PURSUANT TO THIS CHAPTER IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE AS A QUALIFIED SCHOOL.
- D. IN ANY LEGAL PROCEEDING CHALLENGING THE APPLICATION OF THIS CHAPTER TO A QUALIFIED SCHOOL, THE STATE BEARS THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THAT THE LAW IS NECESSARY AND DOES NOT IMPOSE ANY UNDUE BURDEN ON QUALIFIED SCHOOLS.
 - Sec. 3. Arizona empowerment scholarship accounts; agreements

For the 2011 fall semester, the deadline for parents to sign an agreement with the department is August 1, 2011. For the 2012 spring semester, the deadline is December 1, 2011. The department has up to thirty days to process agreements and notify the treasurer of the total number of qualified students who have properly filled out the agreements for empowerment scholarship accounts.

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EXHIBIT B

LASOTA & PETERS PLC

Tel 602 248 2900 Fax 602 248 2999 722 East Osborn Road, Suite 100 Phoenix, Arizona 85014

DONALD M. PETERS dpeters@lasotapeters.com

June 28, 2011

Tom Horne Arizona Attorney General 1275 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2926

Re: Request for action to prevent illegal disbursements pursuant to Senate Bill 1553

Dear Attorney General Horne:

This law firm represents the Arizona School Boards Association, an Arizona taxpayer. This letter is a request pursuant to A.R.S. § 35-213 that you institute an action pursuant to A.R.S. § 35-212 to enjoin the illegal payment of public monies pursuant to Senate Bill 1553, which was enacted in the first regular session of this year's Legislature. A copy of the enactment is attached.

Senate Bill 1553 allows the Arizona Department of Education to give scholarships to qualified pupils. A.R.S. § 15-2402(C). To be qualified, a pupil must be disabled and must attend a private school. A.R.S. § 15-2401(5). The pupil's parent must promise not to enroll the pupil in a public school. A.R.S. § 15-2402(B)(2). In return for that promise and other promises by the parent, the Department of Education is to transfer 90 percent of the base support level that would be paid to a public school, if the student were attending one, to a scholarship fund. A.R.S. § 15-2402(C). The parent may use the money from the scholarship fund to pay tuition and other specified expenses. A.R.S. § 15-2402(B)(4).

One difficulty with this enactment is that it requires that parents waive their children's fundamental right to attend public school as a condition of obtaining a scholarship. The State may not require a waiver of a constitutional right as a condition of obtaining a benefit. See Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Frost, 48 Ariz. 402, 407-408, 62 P.2d 320, 323 (1936); Havasu Heights Ranch and Development Corp. v. State Land Dept., 158 Ariz. 552, 558, 764 P.2d 37, 43 (App. 1988); State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 73, 178 P.3d 1190, 1197 (App. 2008). For this reason alone, Senate Bill 1553 is unconstitutional.

A distinct difficulty is that Senate Bill 1553 violates Article 9, Section 10, of the Arizona Constitution, which has been referred to by the courts as the Aid Clause. As you know, in *Cain v. Horne*, 220 Ariz. 77, 202 P.3d 1178 (2009), the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that two school-

Tom Horne June 28, 2011 Page Two

voucher statutes violated the Aid Clause. The statutes violated the clause because they authorized the indirect transfer of public funds to private schools. Senate Bill 1553 does the same thing. The enactment authorizes scholarships only for pupils who attend private schools. Although the enactment permits the scholarship funds to be used for purposes other than paying tuition at the pupil's private school, the funds may be used for that purpose. Payment of tuition is inevitably what the scholarship funds would primarily be used for. Senate Bill 1553 is therefore invalid in light of the decision in *Cain v. Horne*.

Senate Bill 1553 also violates Article 2, Section 12, of the Arizona Constitution. That provision states: "No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment." The scholarship funds may be used to pay tuition at religious schools. Those schools need not alter their practices to receive the funds. A.R.S. § 15-2404(C). To the extent the funding inures to the benefit of religious schools, the money will be both appropriated for and applied to religious instruction in violation of the Arizona Constitution.

Because Senate Bill 1553 is unconstitutional, any disbursement of funds pursuant to its authority would be illegal. Such disbursements may be enjoined pursuant to A.R.S. § 35-212. *Cain v. Horne*, 220 Ariz. at 84, 202 P.3d at 1185. My client therefore asks that you bring an appropriate action to prevent any disbursements pursuant to Senate Bill 1553.

Man

Sincerely,

Donald M. Peters

DMP/tv attachment

EXHIBIT C



TOM HORNE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OFFICE OF THE ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION/EDUCATION AND HEALTH SECTION

ERIC J. BISTROW

CHIEF DEPUTY

DIRECT: (602) 542-8080

EMAIL: ERIC.BISTROW@AZAG.GOV

July 29, 2011

Donald M. Peters LaSOTA & PETERS, PLC 722 East Osborn Rd, Suite 100 Phoenix, AZ. 85014

Re: Your Letter dated June 28, 2011 requesting the Attorney General file a lawsuit to prevent the alleged illegal disbursement of public monies under Senate Bill 1553

Dear Mr. Peters:

We are in receipt of your letter dated June 28, 2011 addressed to Attorney General Horne. Please be advised that the Attorney General has exercised the discretion provided him by statute (A.R.S. §35-212(A)) and will not be filing the requested lawsuit.

Sincerely.

Deputy Chief

Doc: #2188358